2. Current passenger and freight rail operations and constraints

Passenger rail services in the greater metropolitan area are dominated by CityRail services operated by State Rail.

These services massively outnumber long-distance services to and from Sydney by State Rail (Countrylink) and other passenger rail operators. For this reason, and because there are currently no proposals for competitive services to be provided by other passenger rail operators in the greater metropolitan region, the Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail's consideration of passenger service requirements in the region is essentially based on analyses of CityRail services and, where relevant, their interactions with freight rail services.

In 1999-2000 CityRail's total patronage was 279 million passenger trips, up by 12% from the 248 million carried in 1990 and up by 21% on the 230 million carried at the end of the most recent economic downturn in 1993. On an average weekday 940,000 trips are made on CityRail services, by about 550,000 individuals each day.

CityRail has 306 stations and a fleet of 1,456 double deck electric multiple unit carriages -- 1,138 "suburban" carriages, 80 "outer suburban" carriages and 238 "intercity" carriages -- and 44 single-deck diesel multiple unit carriages.

It operates about 3,000 train services each weekday, comprising:

• Suburban train services in the area bounded by Waterfall to the south, Macarthur to the southwest, Emu Plains to the west and Berowra to the north, and also in the Wollongong area.
• "Intercity" train services (using "intercity" and "outer suburban" trains) in the wider electrified rail network area bounded by Dapto to the south, Lithgow to the west and Newcastle to the north, and
• Diesel train services to and from Bomaderry and the Southern Highlands and in the Hunter, especially between Maitland and Newcastle but also as far north as Scone and Dungog (Figure 1.1).

As part of the overall passenger transport mix in the greater metropolitan region, rail's primary role has traditionally been to carry people relatively long distances to major centres of activity.

In 1996, for example, CityRail accounted for only 5% of all the trips made by all transport modes in the region, but 10% of the kilometres travelled and 14.5% of all journeys to work.

For journeys to work at the major centres, rail is either the dominant mode of transport, with 49% of this market for the Sydney CBD in 1996 (down from 51% in 1981), or second only to private car travel, with a mode share of 40% at North Sydney (up from 30% in 1981), 28% at Chatswood (up from 14%), 23% at Parramatta (up from 14%) and 30% for the city's centres as a whole (31% in 1981).

Rail's second major passenger transport role in the region has been to provide transport for students travelling to and from schools, universities and colleges.

For both of these major roles there is a strong concentration of patronage in the morning peak and, to a lesser extent, the afternoon peak. The latter peak period has lengthened from 2½ to 3½ hours in the last decade.

With the growth in demand in recent years, almost all peak period trains are now operating at or near their full capacity, even though there have been significant increases in the capacity provided on CityRail trains over the last 20 years.

The constraints on CityRail's capacity

Peak patronage demand and hence the capacity provided by peak CityRail services are heavily concentrated on the main routes into the Sydney CBD on the Main West, Illawarra and North Shore lines, which combine the inputs of numerous intercity and suburban lines, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

The factors affecting passenger rail system capacity on any particular section of the rail network, and hence CityRail's ability to meet rapidly increasing patronage demand, include:

• The number of passengers able to be carried on each train. For many years the growth in patronage was successfully handled by introducing double deck trains -- the equivalent of cramming more people into each car on the road -- but the temporary relief afforded by this measure has now been almost totally absorbed.
• The number of CityRail trains available to carry passengers during the peaks. With improvements in the proportion of CityRail's fleet available at these times, the major constraint is the total number of CityRail trains, which in recent years has failed to keep pace with the growth in patronage demand.
• The number of tracks. This is a severe constraint, as in the last 50 years there have been almost no track amplifications -- the equivalent of converting two-lane roads into multiple lane roads -- on the metropolitan rail network.
• The need for CityRail to accommodate three types of demand on the one network: relatively long-distance intercity and outer suburban demand, short-haul suburban demand and "inner city distribution" demand. This necessitates a mix of station stopping patterns, with "fast" ("express" and "limited stop") services sharing the tracks used by slower trains, some stopping at all stations. Because there are limited (if any) overtaking opportunities, this significantly reduces the capacity of many key lines, typically by 35% or more.
• The long train "dwell" times required at several of the busiest stations, including the main CBD underground stations, as passengers leave trains and others wait on overcrowded platforms to board.
• The large number of "flat" (i.e. non grade-separated) junctions, many of which necessitate complex "conflicting" train movements (i.e. trains cannot enter until other trains crossing or merging with their path have either passed through the junction or have been held back from entering the junction themselves). The congestion at these junctions substantially reduces the capacity of all lines feeding into the junctions. (Again, there have been almost no grade separations of rail junctions -- the equivalent of road intersection grade separations -- in the last 50 years.)
• The inability of the signalling system to permit trains to travel closer together, thereby providing greater service frequencies, even in those sections of the rail network where this would otherwise not be ruled out by the necessary mixing of service patterns, junction merging and crossing requirements and long station dwell times.
• A wide range of other constraints, discussed below.

Since the 1980s State Rail has attempted to operate CityRail services in three discrete rail network "sectors", so as to minimise the impact of any service disruptions in any one sector on the rest of the metropolitan rail system (Figure 2.2):

• Sector 1 (Illawarra), extending from the Bondi Junction terminus of the Eastern Suburbs Railway to Bomaderry.
• Sector 2 (south), essentially covering the southwestern suburbs of Sydney, and
• Sector 3 (northwest), essentially covering the western and northern suburbs of Sydney, the Blue Mountains, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter.

As illustrated in Figure 2.2, while Sector 1 is still largely discrete, the growth in patronage (and hence train services) in recent years has led to considerable interaction between Sector 2 and Sector 3 services along the Main West line corridor between Granville and the CBD, and even in the case of Sector 1 rapid growth in patronage on the Illawarra line has forced some diversions of Sector 1 train services onto the City Circle, which was previously reserved for Sector 2.

This problem reflects the fact that in the last 50 years there have been almost no track amplifications on the metropolitan rail network. This means all types of services -- fast and slow, and to and from a wide variety of locations via a wide variety of routes -- are forced to share the same overcrowded tracks, with few if any overtaking opportunities and with major congestion at the routes' various junctions.

The system is rapidly approaching gridlock, as there is a finite limit on how many trains can reliably and safely use each track and, even more significantly, on how closely they can follow each other through multiple congested junctions and/or wait their turn.

The forced breakdown of "sectorisation" as train numbers have increased beyond the capacities of any one sector has been one of the factors contributing to the increased sensitivity of CityRail peak services to disruptions in recent years.

The restoration and strengthening of "sectorisation" operational approaches is therefore one of the main emphases of the Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail, both in the short and medium terms and in the longer run (see sections 3, 4 and 5). This will need to involve both increases in the inherent capacity of the rail infrastructure -- the equivalent of road widening programs -- and the physical separation of the tracks and routes used by trains operating on different existing and new operational sectors.

Mixtures of service patterns

As already indicated, within each of the current three main operational sectors there is a complex mix of "fast" ("express" and "limited stop") services -- generally those travelling longer distances, including intercity services -- and slower trains with a variety of station stopping patterns, including trains which stop at all stations on their routes.

This mixture of services reflects the need for CityRail to accommodate three types of demand on the one network: relatively long-distance intercity and outer suburban demand, short-haul suburban demand and "inner city distribution" demand.

It also reflects the strong desires of commuters, who often prefer to stand for long distances on crowded faster trains than have a seat on slower trains, even when the difference in total travel time is only a few minutes.

In some cases the different services are able to be segregated from each other on four or six track sections of the network, allowing the faster services to overtake. In most cases, however, the almost total absence of track amplifications and junction grade separations in the last 50 years means this option is not available, and complex and disruption-sensitive timetabling is required.

As the number of trains has increased, the operational robustness of timetables with complex mixes of types of services has declined.

Again, the segregation of services to overcome this difficulty is a major focus of the Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail (see sections 3, 4 and 5).

Other operating constraints

The other principal constraints on current CityRail operations, described in detail in the Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail, are (Figure 2.3):

• The fact that key lines are already operating at or beyond their maximum "robust" train frequencies (the theoretical limit is 18 to 20 trains per hour, but the real limit is much less on many lines, because of the capacity-limiting factors already described).

  For example, there are already 20 northbound trains per hour crossing the harbour bridge in the morning peak, so unless the inherent capacity of this line can be increased (see section 4.3) this route cannot be used to accommodate any further growth in the number of trains entering the CBD in the mornings.

  Again, this problem reflects the fact that in the last 50 years there have been almost no track amplifications on the metropolitan rail network. The temporary relief afforded to the network as a whole by the introduction of double deck trains and to the City Circle by the construction of the Eastern Suburbs Railway in the 1970s has now been almost totally absorbed.

• The related problem of passenger overcrowding, which not only exposes passengers to unacceptable travel conditions but can delay trains for long periods at the busiest stations as passengers leave trains and others wait to board.
• The large number of "flat" junctions.

  Because trains using the key junctions have to be very closely timetabled during peak periods, with complex merging and conflicting train movements, there can be acute service reliability problems, as even a slight delay in one train service can very quickly delay large numbers of trains. This effect may not be as visible as at a heavily congested road intersection, because the signalling system automatically holds the trains well back at safe separations, but its impacts are just as real.

  The problem is compounded when the conflicting or merging train services are operating on different "sectors", such as on the Main West corridor and in the inner city and CBD.

• The low speed limits applying at almost all of these junctions, because of the low-speed geometry of the points ("turnouts") and tracks, accentuating the problem just described.
• The need at several locations to terminate and turn back trains on the main lines, rather than on separate tracks specifically developed for this purpose ("turnbacks"). This obstructs the flow of other trains seeking to enter or pass through these locations, and substantially reduces the overall capacity of some key lines, including the Eastern Suburbs Railway and the Main West line.
• Similar obstructions by trains entering and leaving train maintenance facilities at Mortdale, Flemington and Hornsby.
• The shortage of daytime train "stabling" (parking) facilities in the inner city, which forces large numbers of empty trains to travel to the middle-distance train maintenance depots in the morning, after they have brought commuters to the city, and return empty again in the afternoon, cluttering up the system and increasing its vulnerability to disruptions.
• Similarly, the lack of facilities at the main overnight train stabling yards, such as Penrith, Campbelltown, Blacktown and Waterfall, for trains to be washed and minor routine maintenance or repairs to be carried out. This means CityRail trains needing cleaning or even the simplest routine maintenance or repairs have to be taken out of service during the next morning's peak and travel to the middle-distance train maintenance depots.

  In essence, the locations of facilities for minor routine train maintenance reflect the requirements of passenger rail operations some 50 to 70 years ago, when the train maintenance depots were at or near the extremities of suburban rail services, but not those of today's geographically extended operations.

• On some lines, constraints imposed by long and slowmoving freight trains, even in off-peak periods (as discussed below, freight trains are subject to "curfews" during peak periods).
• The obsolescence of much of the signalling control technology used in the greater metropolitan region, dating back in some areas to the early and mid-20th century, and the lack of a modern train control centre. These factors greatly handicap the ability of State Rail signallers and train controllers to efficiently manage train movements on the metropolitan network.

In summary, the metropolitan rail network is now so congested that peak CityRail operations are extremely finely balanced, with minimal margins before delays occur and escalate.

The Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail explicitly addresses all of the factors described above, along with other major factors in poor on-time running performance: rolling stock failures, the increased frequency and severity of rail infrastructure failures, and limitations on incident response and recovery capabilities.

Service reliability and on-time running performance

The principal measure used by State Rail to monitor the punctuality or "on time running" of CityRail services is the proportion of peak services arriving at their destination within 3 minutes of the timetabled time in the case of suburban services and within 5 minutes in the case of intercity services.

Since 1993-94 the target for this measure has been 92%. Although on-time running has generally improved over the last 25 years (Figure 2.4), it declined in 1999-2000 to levels not experienced since the late 1980s, and despite a strong recovery during 2000-01 on-time running is still only about 90%, below State Rail and customer expectations.

On-time running performance is affected by:

• The inherent and growing sensitivity of the nearcapacity rail system to disruptions, because of all the capacity and operational constraint factors discussed above.

  This is well illustrated by the fact that on-time running is poorer on the rail corridors in Sectors 2 and 3, which have the most complex and inter-woven operating patterns and the greatest number of flat junctions, than on Sector 1 lines, where service patterns are less complex and are still comparatively isolated from the other sectors (Figures 2.5 and 2.6).

• Other inefficiencies in rail operations, including:
  • Inefficiencies in incident responses as a result of the current inability of train controllers to know the precise locations of trains on most of the metropolitan network. (This deficiency should not be confused with the past inability of signallers in local signal boxes to know the locations of trains in adjacent track sections controlled by automatic signalling systems, a deficiency now being rectified after the Glenbrook accident of December 1999.)
  • Other past inefficiencies in incident management, now redressed through the establishment of a Railway Coordination Centre to ensure integrated responses are achieved.
  • Vandalism, trespassing on the tracks and passenger falls and suicides.
  • Rolling stock failures.

    The reliability of the CityRail fleet is hampered by the mix of different types of rolling stock, the age of a significant proportion of the fleet and inadequacies in train maintenance facilities, equipment and parts inventories. Until recently it was also hampered by deficiencies, now being redressed, in the maintenance and overhaul regimes for key components such as doors.

    The Government has recently made some important funding commitments to enable these issues to be addressed in the short term, as discussed in section 6.3.

  • Rail infrastructure failures, including track, signalling, points, electrical and civil infrastructure failures.

    Although infrastructure failures account for only 15% of all the incidents delaying peak CityRail trains, they usually cause longer delays than the other factors (Figure 2.7), and in 1999-2000 they were responsible for almost 30% of CityRail train delays, with both the number of rail infrastructure failures and their impacts on CityRail services being well up on earlier years (Figure 2.8).

    About three-quarters of the rail infrastructure reliability problems delaying CityRail peak services are associated with track and signalling failures at junctions.

    The factors contributing to the increase in rail infrastructure reliability problems in recent years are discussed in section 2.3 below, and strategies to address these problems are summarised in section 4.10.

    Again, the Government has recently made some important funding commitments to improve rail infrastructure maintenance in the short term, as discussed in section 4.10.

2.2 Freight operations

Most of the railway lines used by freight trains in the greater metropolitan region are shared with passenger services, although there are dedicated freight lines between North Strathfield Junction, Flemington Goods Junctions, Chullora, Sefton Goods Junction, Enfield, Rozelle and Port Botany (Figures 1.1 and 1.2).

Rail freight services within and through the greater metropolitan region comprise:

• General interstate and intrastate freight services, including inter-modal container freight services, focussed primarily on the major freight terminals at Enfield and Chullora and the port facilities at Port Botany and Rozelle
• Cross-metropolitan freight transport linking Port Botany and Rozelle with Enfield, Chullora, Clyde and Leightonfield and increasingly also with smaller freight facilities such as new facilities at Minto, Ingleburn and St Marys
• Coal transport from the western coalfields to Port Kembla and, on occasions, the coal terminals at Newcastle
• Coal transport from the Newcastle, Hunter and Gloucester coalfields to the export coal terminals at Newcastle, and
• Movements of grain to the ports and to refining facilities near Nowra.

The effects of this curfew are most critical on the Main South line between Macarthur and Sefton Goods Junction, part of the main routes connecting Melbourne and Adelaide with the Sydney freight terminals and ports and Brisbane, because the busiest times for freight trains arriving from Melbourne coincide with the busiest times for CityRail commuter services from Campbelltown and Liverpool to the city.

On the Main North line to Newcastle (and on to Brisbane) the constraint is less significant, because there are fewer freight trains and operating patterns are different. For this corridor it is likely that a guarantee of two freight train "paths" per hour for 22 hours per day in the contra-peak direction -- i.e. with a two-hour peak direction "curfew" -- would suffice to meet anticipated freight demand, and even this is regarded by Rail Infrastructure Corporation as a long-term target, rather than one to be achieved in the metropolitan area in the short to medium term, because there are other, more severe constraints on Sydney-Brisbane freight services further to the north, on the single-track North Coast line.

Investigations over the last four years have identified the most cost-effective ways of progressively reducing the curfews on the Main South and Main North corridors, including the construction of a new bidirectional track from Macarthur to the Sydney side of Cabramatta Junction for use primarily by freight services. These works, which are now the subject of detailed design and environmental studies but will proceed only if Commonwealth funding is provided, are discussed in sections 4.4 and 5 below.

Other constraints on rail freight services in the greater metropolitan region include:

• Inadequate capacity on the Port Botany goods line from Marrickville to the port, which is expected to have to cope with a doubling of freight demand over the next few years. Amplification and resignalling works are already underway, although the final stage of these works -- duplication from Cooks River to Marrickville -- may not be needed for at least five years.
• Capacity constraints for freight services on the Main North line north of Wyong, potentially necessitating extra passing loops, especially if a proposed new coal mine in the Wyong area proceeds, and capacity constraints on the Hunter coal network, including the junctions leading into the export coal terminals in the Newcastle area.

  The capacity constraints affecting Hunter coal freight services -- and by implication CityRail and long-distance passenger services in that region -- are potentially severe, but are being addressed in separate RIC capital works programs and studies and are beyond the scope of the Long-Term Strategic Plan for Rail.

• The distance of the rail freight network from areas in western Sydney which are now being developed for industrial purposes. A proposal for a new "Sydney West Industrial" line in the Erskine Park/Horsley Park region, to help redress this deficiency and actively encourage "rail friendly" industrial development in this region, is among the longer-term rail network development options outlined in section 5 below.
• The complexity of rail operations and infrastructure required to service the increasing demand for larger numbers of relatively small rail-road intermodal freight terminals. For example, the operation of rail freight services into and out of the new Minto and Ingleburn terminals -- on opposite sides of a two-track Main South line which is likely to become a three-track line in the next few years and ultimately a four-track line -- will inevitably be constrained by conflicts with passenger services and "through" freight services on this important corridor.

2.3 Rail infrastructure maintenance and reliability

One of the main factors in this degradation was the downgrading of many "major periodic" maintenance programs during the 1990s. Although reductions in major periodic maintenance expenditures (Figure 2.9) were intended at the time to be at least partly counterbalanced by efficiency gains, and funding levels were reduced in this expectation, in practice the anticipated gains were only partially realised, even on lines maintained by the private sector after competitive selection processes. Because of the reduced funding, and also because other projects were regarded as having a higher priority at the time, the scope of major maintenance programs was severely curtailed.

These programs -- which can be traced back to upgrading works initiated around the time of the Granville disaster -- included a track strengthening and concrete resleepering program, a signalling modernisation program, an overhead wiring modernisation program, a junction renewal and upgrading program and ballast cleaning, track tamping, rail grinding, timber resleepering and rerailing programs.

The downgrading of these major periodic maintenance programs has now resulted in a serious maintenance backlog, degraded asset quality and reliability and increased day-today routine maintenance costs.

Even with increased funding, this backlog will be difficult to overcome, as Rail Infrastructure Corporation's major plant items are old and incapable of meeting production requirements (many of the items which will have to be used over the next couple of years have been taken out of "mothballs") .

The actions and expenditures required to redress this situation are discussed in section 4.10 of this report.

2.4 Safety

The major deficiencies in metropolitan rail safety systems, almost all of which have been or are now being addressed, have been:

• Inadequacies in the management, training, mentoring, testing and supervision of train drivers, signallers and train controllers, especially in the case of less experienced drivers. (All of these inadequacies have been expressly addressed, in conjunction with relevant staff and unions.)
• Deficiencies and unnecessary complexities in the Safeworking Rules which govern all operations of the railway system and in the application of these rules. (Revised and much simpler safety rules are now being developed, in conjunction with relevant staff and unions. After a sixmonth period of staff training, new rules for work on the tracks will become effective in November 2001, new rules for train operations will take effect from March 2002 and new rules for signalling will take effect from June 2002.)
• Deficiencies in signalling and communications systems, including the inability of signallers in many local signal boxes to view the locations of trains in adjacent automatic signalling areas ("colloquially known as "dark territories"), poor sightlines to some trackside signals, the unreliability of some communications systems and incompatibilities between different communications systems. (The measures required to overcome these deficiencies are summarised in section 4.9 below.)
• Deficiencies in signal and train control systems, many of which are now extremely dated and maintenance-intensive and almost all of which offer very limited capabilities. For example, signallers and train controllers are not able to view the location of trains on most sections of the metropolitan network (Figure 2.10), even those sections controlled from local signal boxes other than their own, so they have to rely heavily on telephone-based communi cations. (Again, the measures required to overcome these deficiencies are summarised in section 4.9 below.)
• The need to rely on "train stops" -- a dated and maintenance-intensive system of trackside mechanical devices which automatically activate CityRail trains' brakes -- to prevent train collisions if a train passes a (red) signal "at danger". These train stops are not able to stop freight trains, and Countrylink trains are only now being fitted with the necessary systems. (These limitations are inherent, and can only be overcome by adopting more modern systems. Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems, which can offer much better protection for all types of trains, are to be piloted in Sydney in the next two years, as described in section 4.3 below.)
• The absence of even this "train stop" system on the intercity lines. (A program to fit train stops on these lines within the next two years is now underway.)
• The potential for a serious loss of life if there were a major fire on a train on the underground sections of the network or at an underground station, other than on the new Airport line, which incorporates modern fire and life safety measures. (The measures required to overcome these risks are discussed in section 4.7 below.)
• The need to relocate some "catchpoints" -- points designed to deliberately derail any train passing a signal "at danger" on a siding before it can enter a main line, thereby reducing the risk of a collision with another train -- so that a derailed train can safely come to a stop. (Corrective action at 13 locations identified as posing a "high" risk will be completed in 2002.)
• The ongoing need to protect and improve the safety and security of passengers on trains and at stations. (For details on station upgrades, see section 4.6 below.)
• The need to narrow the gaps between trains and platforms at many stations, to reduce the risks of passengers falling beneath the trains or otherwise injuring themselves. (Again, see section 4.6 below.)
• The need for improved security fencing along rail corridors, including fencing for the cycleways being established on some corridors and security screens on bridges over railway lines. (This need is being addressed by RIC.)